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Law, Agency and Emergency in British Imperial Politics:  
Conflict between the Government and the King’s Court  
in Bombay in the 1820s 
Haruki Inagaki* 
Abstract. Britain’s Indian empire transformed itself in the early nineteenth century: a hybrid 
commercial empire of port cities became a sovereign ‘despotic’ rule over the vast inner territories. 
This article tries to understand the nature of this transition from the perspective of conflict 
between the rule of law and emergency, emphasising the role of the Indians’ legal practices in the 
structural transformation of imperial judicial politics. As a case study, it looks at two legal cases 
in Bombay in the 1820s in which the government of the East India Company was challenged by 
Indian merchants in the King’s Court, which was independent from the Company. The first case 
involves a Parsi merchant going against the Company. He demanded compensation for the 
Company’s breach of contract in the Second Maratha War. The other case is a Hindu merchant’s 
fight against the governor of Bombay and the collector of Poona. The issue was the confiscation 
of private property as wartime booty during the Third Maratha War. In both cases, the merchants 
used multiple legal methods to realise their demands, and the King’s Court ruled in favour of 
them. The judges rejected most of the evidence submitted by the government and claimed that the 
King’s Court had the power to check the conduct of government officers in times of war and 
emergency. So, in Bombay, the government’s logic of emergency was denied by the judges’ logic 
of law. But this heightened the government’s sense of danger, which was still involved in a series 
of disturbances and revolts in the Deccan and Gujarat in the 1820s. The government appealed the 
cases to the Privy Council in London, and the decisions were overturned. This meant that the rule 
of law was nullified and the logic of emergency was sanctioned in the appellate structure of the 
empire. By looking at these developments, I argue that the Indians’ agency in using the law 
against the government and the King’s Court’s support for it resulted in weakening the control of 
civil law over the government and its officers. 
Introduction 
Historians have suggested that the mode of colonialism in India crucially changed in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: hybrid, plural and networked colonial politics 
centred on maritime coastal cities was transformed into a sovereign, bureaucratic and 
militarist territorial domination based on ‘colonial knowledge’.1 Legal historians have given 
                                                        
* Ph.D Student, King’s College London, UK. 
1 C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830, Harlow, 1989; Radhika Singha, A 
Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India, Oxford, 1998; Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in 
Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal, Cambridge, 2007; Jon E. Wilson, The Domination of Strangers: 
Modern Governance in Eastern India 1780–1835, Basingstoke, 2008; Philip J. Stern, ‘Rethinking Institutional 
Transformations in the Making of Modern Empire: The East India Company in Madras’, Journal of Colonialism and 
Colonial History, 9: 2, 2008. 
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a fresh insight on this transition by pointing out a parallel development: hybrid and 
multi-centred legal pluralism in the eighteenth century was transformed into a more 
state-centred sovereign form of justice in the early nineteenth century.2 This transition 
entailed a significant consequence: British colonialism became more despotic in the early 
nineteenth century. The civil government was subordinated to garrison-state militarism, and 
the executive was allowed discretion to pursue its fiscal-military imperatives unrestrained by 
the judiciary.3 An earlier attitude of enlightenment universalism was replaced by utilitarian 
liberal authoritarianism, justifying the colonial state’s despotic rule which would have been 
regarded as unconstitutional at home.4 Understanding the nature of this transition has been 
one of the most important themes of British imperial history. 
The key to understanding this transition is the dilemma of the ‘rule of law’ and 
‘emergency’. Political theorists and postcolonial scholars have pointed out that there was no 
rule of law in the colonies—colonialism was a ‘state of exception’ in which the colonised 
were debased to the disposable and exterminable ‘bare life’.5 While some historians 
counter-argue that the rule of law actually reduced the coerciveness of the British colonial 
rule,6 others endorse it by emphasising the vast amount of evidence of everyday violence.7 
But a more persuasive line of argument is offered by Nasser Hussain, who examines the 
cases of martial law and suspension of habeas corpus in colonial India and argues that the 
state of emergency was not outside the rule of law but constitutive of it.8 Lauren Benton and 
Mark Condos further elaborate that the logic of war and emergency was incorporated into a 
new conception of the rule of law in nineteenth-century colonies; the state of exception at the 
moment of conquest was institutionalised in the civil government of the post-conquest era.9 
The problem of this historiography is that the relationship between the rule of law and 
emergency has not been sufficiently contextualised, and the driving force of the 
                                                        
2 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History 1400–1900, Cambridge, 2002; Gagan D. 
S. Sood, ‘Sovereign Justice in Precolonial Maritime Asia: The Case of Mayor’s Court of Bombay 1726–1798’, 
Itinerario, 37: 2, 2013, 46–72. See also, Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America 
and Australia 1788–1836, Cambridge Mass, 2010. 
3 Bayly, Imperial Meridian; Douglas M. Peers, Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State 
in India 1819–1835, London, 1995; Robert J. Smith, ‘John Bull’s Proconsuls: Military Officers who Administered the 
British Empire 1815–1840’, Kansas State Univ. PhD thesis, 2008; Mark Condos, ‘British Military Ideology and 
Practice in Panjab c. 1849–1920’, Cambridge Univ. PhD thesis, 2013. 
4 Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford, 1959; Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in 
Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought, Chicago, 1999; Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial 
Liberalism in Britain and France, Princeton, 2005; Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of 
Liberal Imperialism, Princeton NJ, 2010. 
5 Johan Geertsema, ‘Exception, Bare Life and Colonialism’, in Emergencies and the Limits of Legality, ed. Victor V. 
Ramraj, Cambridge, 2008, 337–59. 
6 R. W. Kostal, Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law, Oxford, 2005; Martin J. Wiener, An 
Empire on Trial: Race, Murder and Justice under British Rule 1870–1935, Cambridge, 2009. 
7 Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in Britain: White Violence and the Rule of Law, Cambridge, 2010; Jonathan Saha, 
Law, Disorder and the Colonial State: Corruption in Burma c.1900, Basingstoke, 2013. 
8 Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law, Ann Arbor, 2003. 
9 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires 1400–1900, Cambridge, 2010; 
Condos, ‘British Military Ideology and Practice in Panjab’. See also, Elizabeth Kolsky, ‘The Colonial Rule of Law and 
the Legal Regime of Exception: Frontier “Fanaticism” and State Violence in British India’, American Historical 
Review, 120: 4, 2015, 1218–46. 
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transformation remains unclear. Historians have pointed out that the colonial government 
had a desire to retain power of discretionary intervention in times of emergency, but this is 
often assumed just by referring to abstract theories of state and state-formation.10 Besides, 
although most of the studies have centred on the analysis of the British ‘colonial state’ as a 
monolith, the British authority was unstable and fractured in this period, and the conflict 
within the British was as important as the conflict between the British and the Indians in 
shaping the future form of governance.11 Relatedly, while Foucauldian scholars have 
produced rich scholarship on colonial governmentality (internal exertion of power through 
knowledge), this should not divert our attention from the dimension of sovereignty (external 
exertion of power through coercion) and officials’ anxiety about it.12 More attention should 
be paid to the interactions between multiple actors in practical circumstances which 
suppressed the rule of law and strengthened the logic of emergency. More specifically, to use 
A. V. Dicey’s criteria, we need to examine how and to what extent the British imperial and 
colonial governments denied predominance of regular law, exempted their servants from 
municipal courts, and constructed colonial constitutions which were not based on the natural 
rights of the subjects.13 
Recent studies of social history of law in India give us a useful perspective, as they tell us 
that the agency of the Indians was the driving force of the dynamics of social changes in 
colonial legal history. The Indians actively used the court of law in business and demanded 
new legislations, which led to the remodelling of social and economic institutions.14 The 
British court was popular as a means of dispute resolution because the British judges could 
not understand the details of the cases and the Indian litigants could easily manipulate the 
result.15 Thus, the social policy of the colonial government often involved complex and 
protracted negotiations with the Indian groups, particularly in the realms of family, property, 
charity and caste.16 The everyday legal practices of Indians shaped the political culture of 
                                                        
10 Hussain, Jurisprudence of Emergency; Benton, Search of Sovereignty; Mithi Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of 
Empire: A Legend and Political History 1774–1950, Oxford, 2009. 
11 Wilson, Domination of Strangers; Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, Berkeley, 1997; Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections 1815–45: Patronage, the 
Information Revolution and Colonial Government, Manchester, 2005. 
12 Deana Heath, ‘Bureaucracy, Power and Violence in Colonial India’, in Empires and Bureaucracy from Late Antiquity 
to the Modern World, ed. Peter Crooks and Tim Parsons, Cambridge, 2016; Jon Wilson, ‘The Temperament of 
Empire: Law and Conquest in Late Nineteenth Century India’, in Subjects, Citizens and Law: Colonial and 
Postcolonial India, ed. Gunnel Cederlof and Sanjukta Das Gupta, London, 2016. 
13 A. V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, ed. J. W. F. Allison, Oxford, 2004. 
14 Niles Brimnes, ‘Beyond Colonial Law: Indigenous Litigation and the Contestation of Property in the Mayor’s Court in 
Late Eighteenth-Century Madras’, Modern Asian Studies, 37: 3, 2003, 513–50; Tirthankar Roy, ‘Indigo and Law in 
Colonial India’, Economic History Review, 64: S1, 2011, 60–75. 
15 Pamela G. Price, ‘The “Popularity” of the Imperial Courts of Law: Three Views of the Anglo-Indian Legal Encounter’, 
in European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa 
and Asia, ed. W. J. Mommsen and J. A. De Moor, Oxford, 1992, 179–200. 
16 Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture and Market Governance in Late Colonial India, Durham 2009; Hiroyuki 
Kotani, Indo Shakai Bunkashi Ron: Dento Shakai kara Shokuminchi teki Kindai e [Social and Cultural History of 
India: From ‘Traditional’ Society to Colonial Modernity], Tokyo, 2010; Rachel L. Sturman, The Government of 
Social Life in Colonial India: Liberalism, Religious Law and Women’s Rights, Cambridge, 2012. 
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particular legal institutions,17 as well as their identities.18 In summary, the social, economic 
and political life of Indians was deeply embedded in the colonial state’s legal framework, 
and the active participation of the Indians in this ‘self-conscious site of contestation’ 
produced changes in colonial legal institutions.19 Based on these insights, this article 
emphasises the role of Indian agency and legal practices in provoking the transition to 
despotism in the colonial judicial structure. 
This study looks at two cases in the 1820s in which Bombay merchants and bankers used 
the King’s Court to challenge the government. The King’s Court was established by royal 
charters independently from the East India Company (EIC). It had jurisdiction over 
Europeans and Indians in the presidency town of Bombay, while the rural districts (mofussil) 
were under the jurisdiction of the Company’s Court. However, the Indians in the mofussil 
came to Bombay and instituted suits in the King’s Court for various purposes, and the King’s 
Court started to claim their extended jurisdiction, causing frictions with the Company’s 
judicial authorities.20 The most notorious was the battle between Elijah Impey’s Calcutta 
Supreme Court and Governor Warren Hastings.21 In this context, the King’s Court was an 
institutional embodiment of legal pluralism. 
In the first case, a Parsi merchant sued the government for breach of contract during the 
Second Maratha War (1803–05). In the second case, a Hindu merchant/banker filed a suit to 
recover personal property that was confiscated as wartime booty in the Third Maratha War 
(1817–18). Naturally, the government’s conduct in times of war and emergency became the 
main issue in the court. In both cases, the King’s Court ruled in favour of the merchants, the 
government appealed to the Privy Council in London, and it overturned the decisions in 
Bombay. Nonetheless, the effect of these cases was not small. The Indians became confident 
that the King’s Court would support their claims, while the government started to fear that 
their authority would be impaired and a huge amount of losses would be incurred by paying 
out compensation in the future. 
I examine how the merchants tried to realise their demands inside and outside the King’s 
                                                        
17 Arthur Mitchell Fraas, ‘‘They have Travailed into a Wrong Latitude’: The Laws of England, Indian Settlements and 
the British Imperial Constitution 1726–1773’, Duke Univ. Ph.D thesis, 2011; Abhinav Chandrachud, An Independent, 
Colonial Judiciary: A History of the Bombay High Court during the British Raj 1862–1947, Oxford, 2015; James 
Jaffe, Ironies of Colonial Governance: Law, Custom and Justice in Colonial India, Cambridge, 2015. 
18 Mattison Mines, ‘Courts of Laws and Styles of Self in Eighteenth-Century Madras: From Hybrid to Colonial Self’, 
Modern Asian Studies, 35: 1, 2001, 33–74; Chandra Mallampalli, Race, Religion and Law in Colonial India: Trials of 
an Interracial Family, Cambridge, 2011; Mitra Sharafi, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture 
1772–1947, Cambridge, 2014. 
19 Sandra den Otter, ‘Law, Authority and Colonial Rule’, in India and the British Empire, ed. Douglas M. Peers and 
Nandini Gooptu, Oxford, 2012; Zoë Laidlaw, ‘Breaking Britannia’s Bounds? Law, Settlers, and Space in Britain’s 
Imperial Historiography’, Historical Journal, 55: 3, 2012, 807–30 at 822; Nandini Chatterjee and Lakshmi 
Subramanian, ‘Law and the Spaces of Empire: Introduction to the Special Issue’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial 
History, 15: 1, 2014. 
20 The Mayor’s Court of Bombay was established in 1726, whose judges were all merchants. The Recorder’s Court 
superseded it in 1796. A barrister was sent from Britain as the recorder, or the chief justice. James Mackintosh was the 
most famous recorder. The Supreme Court was established in 1823. Three barristers constituted the bench. It was 
merged with the Company’s Court in 1862 in the newly established Bombay High Court. A reliable history of Indian 
legal institutions is M. P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal and Constitutional History, 6th edn., New Delhi, 2006. 
21 Travers, Ideology and Empire. 
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Court and how the judges and the government responded to it. I contend that the Bombay 
merchants’ use of the King’s Court caused a sense of crisis among the government officials. 
Particularly, they were concerned about the judges’ interference in the government’s military 
operation in times of emergency, as the government was still involved in a series of 
disturbances and revolts in the Deccan and Gujarat in the 1820s. I suggest that the 
government’s sense of danger about the alliance between the Indians and the King’s Court in 
such circumstances was an important context in which the King’s Court’s logic of law was 
suppressed and the government’s logic of emergency was sanctioned in the appellate 
structure of the empire. I use the Bombay government’s consultations in the India Office 
Records to reconstruct the process of negotiation in Bombay and to examine the 
government’s discourse. Published reports of the judgements in the Oriental Herald and the 
Asiatic Journal are used to analyse the judges’ discourse. The Privy Council Printed Papers 
are used to examine the debate in London.22 
Articulating the King’s Court’s Identity: The Case of Cursetjee Manockjee 
The first case is Cursetjee Manockjee v. EIC. Cursetjee Manockjee, a Parsi merchant, 
became the government contractor for the provision of rice in December 1802. In the next 
year, the Second Maratha War broke out. The Bombay government was requested rice by 
Arthur Wellesley (later Duke of Wellington) for his Madras army, then stationed at Poona. 
Manockjee sold rice at the market rate, which was two rupees per bag cheaper than the 
contract rate, because he was told that it was not for public use. However, he later realised 
that the rice was supplied to the army and demanded compensation in 1804. This conflict, 
known as ‘the rice case’, continued for more than 25 years. Manockjee resorted to the King’s 
Court when his claim was repeatedly rejected by the government. He sent several petitions to 
the government demanding for the principal sum of Rs 1,48,000. The Bombay government 
only admitted Rs 12,500. Manockjee also sent a petition to the Court of Directors in 1809, 
but they just increased the amount to Rs 43,500 in 1814. Manockjee finally instituted a suit 
in the Recorder’s Court in 1820.23 
Manockjee was an important figure in the government’s war efforts, as he was also in 
charge of supplying clothes, foods, military goods and ballast to various government 
departments.24 As Randolph Cooper has shown, the EIC’s military logistics increasingly 
relied on Indian-based military manufacturing, and the government had to be sensitive in its 
relationship with civilian contractors such as Manockjee.25 Furthermore, he was also 
                                                        
22 The High Court Records of the Maharashtra State Archives including the proceedings of these cases are not catalogued 
and therefore inaccessible. Newspapers Bombay Gazette and Bombay Courier do not contain the court proceedings. 
23 Gov to Court of Directors [CoD], Bombay Military Letter [BML], 25 Mar. 1825, IOR/L/MIL/3/1725. 
24 Bombay Government [Gov] to George Norton, Advocate General, 21 June 1823, Bombay Military Consultations 
[BMC] 25 June 1823, 3655–60. Unless otherwise stated, references of government consultations are to British Library, 
India Office Records, Proceedings and Consultations [IOR/P]. 
25 Randolf G. S. Cooper, ‘Beyond Beasts and Bullion: Economic Considerations in Bombay’s Military Logistics 1803’, 
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important as a leader of the Parsis in Bombay, who dominated the city’s commercial 
activities, such as shipbuilding and cotton, silk and opium trade with China.26 He was a 
member of the Parsi Panchayat (‘council of elders’) between 1818 and 1845. So the 
government’s relationship with the business community was also potentially destabilised by 
this prolonged conflict. 
The rice case was one of many claims demanded by Manockjee. He used multiple legal 
methods to realise his demands. First, he filed an equity suit in the Recorder’s Court for his 
distillery claim, which was settled in his favour. Second, he claimed compensation for 
barracks which he built during the Second Maratha War. It was settled in 1825 by arbitration 
and the government paid Rs 2,40,000, including 6% compound interest.27 Third, he filed a 
suit in the Recorder’s Court against the government for his provision of sandals during the 
war. He demanded Rs 15,000, but the ruling was in favour of the EIC.28 
The point is that Manockjee was well acquainted with British legal procedures. He could 
use various legal tools to claim his demands both inside and outside the court. He filed his 
claims in multiple divisions in the Recorder’s Court, and at the same time he sought 
alternative dispute resolutions outside the court. Arbitration was his preferred method. In the 
barrack claim, he proposed that he would accept a pension instead of reducing the rate of 
interest. In the rice case, he proposed that he would accept the result of the trial if the 
government would abandon their appeal to the Privy Council. In these endeavours, 
Manockjee collaborated with his attorney, Frederick Ayrton, whose critical attitude towards 
the government was notorious among government officials. 
Manockjee succeeded in the Recorder’s Court, but only the second time. It was first 
examined by Recorder Anthony Buller in 1822. He did not admit compensation for supply to 
the Madras army and awarded Rs 47,000 with 6% simple interest, or a total Rs 1,00,000. 
Manockjee applied for a new trial. It was held in 1823 before Edward West, a newly arrived 
recorder. He was an important figure in Bombay in the 1820s. He experienced a series of 
conflicts with Governor Mountstuart Elphinstone over various issues such as policing and 
press regulation.29 In the trial, West overturned all objections of the government and judged 
in favour of Manockjee.30 He awarded the full principal of Rs 1,48,000 with 9% compound 
interest, which amounted to Rs 5,27,000 in total. It was significantly higher than Buller’s 
                                                                                                                                               
Modern Asian Studies, 33: 1, 1999, 159–83. 
26 Jesse S. Palsetia, The Parsis of India: Preservation of Identity in Bombay City, Leiden 2001, chapter 1. 
27 The government admitted it not on the ground of law, but as a gratuity. Francis Warden to the Secretary and Translator 
in the Office of Country Correspondence, 4 Dec. 1809, Appendix to respondent’s case, IOR/L/L/Box 620 (92). 
28 Gov to CoD, BML, 17 Feb. 1826, IOR/L/MIL/3/1725; Gov to CoD, BML, 24 Feb. 1827, IOR/L/MIL/3/1726. The 
government was preparing a counterclaim on this case, amounting to Rs 2,25,000, but it was abandoned as the sandal 
claim was settled in favour of the government. 
29 F. D. Drewitt, Bombay in the Days of George IV: Memoirs of Sir Edward West, London, 1907. He is now chiefly 
famous as a political economist. Maxine L. Berg, ‘West, Sir Edward (bap. 1782, d. 1828)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford, 2004 [ODNB] does not give sufficient space for his career in Bombay. 
30 The EIC’s defence was based on three points: that Manockjee waived his rights under the contracts by acting under 
Major Moor; that Manockjee lost his remedy by his negligence in bringing the claim in earlier time; and that the 
purchased rice was supplied for the Madras troop and therefore not within the contract. 
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former award.31 
The judgement was characterised by two points. First, West articulated the King’s 
Court’s identity in his criticism of the government. He said that the government treated 
Manockjee ‘throughout the whole of the business most unjustly … [and] shamefully’. He 
emphasised the timidity of Indians facing the tyranny of the EIC. For them, the ‘government 
and despot are synonymous’; he could ‘readily believe that nothing but the severe distress, or 
the grossest injustice’ drove him to legal actions.32 In such a situation, the raison d’être of 
the King’s Court was as follows: 
I cannot allow it to be supposed for a moment that in this Court, the King’s Court 
instituted as it has been by the Crown and Legislature of Great Britain, mainly for the 
very purpose of giving the natives of this country redress against the Company and the 
Company’s servants, I say I cannot allow it to be surmised that the meanest or poorest 
native would not at any period of the existence of this Court obtain a full measure of 
justice against the Government.33 
In this way, West identified the King’s Court as the sole protector of the Indians 
oppressed by the Company. This self-fashioning became the ideological basis of the judicial 
review over the conduct of the government in the 1820s. 
However, this did not mean that West was totally in favour of Manockjee. Manockjee 
explained that the delay in filing the suit was partly due to his having sought redress from the 
Court of Directors in Britain. He tried to use every means to recover his damages and did not 
regard the King’s Court as the only means of redress. Rather, the structure of dual or multiple 
powers was essential for his judicial and political manoeuvre, because he could resort to an 
authority to challenge another. However, the judge said that it was not necessary, ‘as this Court 
was always open to him’.34 It is hinted here that he did not approve of Manockjee’s forum 
shopping and tried to impress on him that the King’s Court was the only supreme tribunal in 
the presidency. West’s conception of the King’s Court as the defender of natives was 
accompanied by his assertion that the King’s Court held sovereign status in the presidency. 
The second point was that West based his argument on Indian practices and usages, 
rather than English precedents. The issue was concerned with Manockjee’s claim on the 
interest on unliquidated damages. According to English case law, he was not entitled to the 
interest, but West articulated that the court of law in India should not be hindered by English 
precedent, ‘especially as a very different practice has prevailed in the Courts of India’.35 In 
effect, West advocated a system of Indian common law, distinct from the English one, which 
was to be formed by the King’s Court. 
                                                        
31 Oriental Herald, 3, 1824, 267. 
32 Ibid., 269. 
33 Ibid., 269–70. 
34 Ibid., 270. 
35 West even criticised the English practice based on the Indian usage; he said that the distinction between liquidated and 
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This attitude was supported by the non-official community in Bombay.36 The other two 
aldermen judges, Benjamin Philipps, a surgeon, and William Ashburner, a merchant, 
decided more favourably than West on the matter of interest.37 British merchants and 
lawyers testified in favour of Manockjee. David Malcolm, a member of an agency house, 
stated that the interest should be compound rather than simple. James Henry Crawford, of 
one of the large agency houses, also stood as a witness for the plaintiff. John Sandwith, an 
attorney, even said that although he did not know the cases in which an interest was charged 
on unliquidated debts, it might have been so.38 
The government officials expressed several concerns about the judgement. First, the 
Indians’ litigiousness was troublesome. Francis Warden, a member of the governor’s council, 
commented that the Indians were not timid in making lawsuits against the government; on 
the contrary, they had well understood the value of the King’s Court and had fearlessly gone 
to the court and made suits against the government in the same way as against a private 
individual.39 Second, West’s award of compound interest was problematic because the same 
high rate of interest might be awarded in Manockjee’s other claims.40 
But the government was most alarmed by the King’s Court’s interference in the military 
operation of the government in a time of war. The government contended that a contract 
made before war broke out should not be extended to the emergency supplies in a time of 
war. Manockjee insisted that the terms of contract should be broadly interpreted and the 
supply in wartime should be included. West supported Manockjee, which meant that the 
King’s Court could review the government’s military discretion and order compensation 
retrospectively. To make matters worse, the judge had an erroneous understanding of the 
military constitution. Warden explained that, while the three presidencies were totally 
independent in terms of military command and economy, West misconceived that the Indian 
army was one and the same and the damages incurred from supply to any army in any 
presidency should be compensated by the British government in India.41 
In a move that was designed not only to deny the merchant’s claim for interest, but also 
to maintain the distinction between the civil and the military and to keep its autonomy and 
discretion in cases of emergency, the government prepared to appeal to the Privy Council, 
                                                        
36 For the radical culture of the presidency towns, see, for Calcutta, P. J. Marshall, ‘The Whites of British India 1780–
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Dodson and Brian A. Hacther, London, 2012, 231–48. Bayly briefly mentioned the Cursetjee Manockjee case in his 
Recovering Liberties. C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, 
Cambridge, 2012, 82–3. But Bayly’s argument that the Indian merchant claimed ‘right to trade as British subjects’ is 
inadequate as it identified the claim of the London radicals with that of merchant himself, ignoring the discursive 
function of network. 
37 They admitted interest between 1804 and 1815. West only admitted it between 1804 and 1809. Oriental Herald, 3, 
1824, 269. 
38 IOR/L/L/Box 620 (92), Appendix to respondent’s case, 21–3. 
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the final court of colonial legal affairs.42 In the appeal paper, it insisted that the terms of the 
contract could not be applied to ‘an extraordinary and accidental supply of rice’ to the 
Madras army. It also argued that the judgement was ‘contrary to the established rules of the 
law of England respecting the allowance of interest’.43 
The appeal was granted in the Recorder’s Court in June 1823, but the debate in the Privy 
Council did not start until June 1828. During the interval, Manockjee continued his 
negotiation with the government. First, Manockjee published an open letter to the governor 
of Bombay in the Oriental Herald to abandon the appeal; he also proposed lowering the rate 
of interest if the government would not appeal.44 After these attempts failed and the appeal 
was lodged, he published an open letter to the Court of Directors in the Oriental Herald in 
December 1826. Manockjee actually demanded more in the letter. He requested that they 
order the Bombay government to pay the additional five years’ interest, which was rejected 
by the King’s Court.45 This meant that Manockjee was trying to pit the Company against the 
King’s Court to increase the amount of compensation. Manockjee also tried to get support 
from a director of the EIC, John Morris, a former Bombay civil servant.46 
Meanwhile, the radicals in London picked up the case as an example of the Company’s 
oppression of the Indians. The main organ of their criticism was the Oriental Herald, a 
monthly journal edited by James Silk Buckingham, a central figure of colonial reformers in 
this period.47 It reported West’s judgement and Manockjee’s open letter, and the editor also 
published an article titled ‘Fraudulent and Disgraceful Transaction of the Bombay 
Government’, in which he linked Manockjee’s case with his cause of the freedom of the 
press in India.48 In this way, Manockjee’s case gradually became famous in London as well 
as in Bombay. In such a situation, the discussion in the Privy Council was held before Judge 
John Leach, whig Master of the Rolls. 
First, it is important to note that the government’s claim of military emergency was 
rejected by the court. It shows that the Privy Council cannot simply be equated with the 
government. J. B. Bosanquet, the EIC’s standing counsel, emphasised that it was ‘an 
extraordinary demand’ made ‘in a sudden emergency’ outside the contract.49 But Judge 
Leach rejected the view, as it was not supported by the evidence submitted to the court.50 He 
decided that Manockjee was entitled to full compensation for the principal.51 
As for the interest, however, the Privy Council reversed the decision of the Recorder’s 
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Court. The debate in the chamber was decidedly moralistic on this matter, chiefly due to the 
speech of Thomas Denman, counsel for Manockjee, who embodied the age of reform in the 
legal world.52 He criticised the case for being detrimental to the confidence of Indians 
towards the British legal system, stating that ‘the forbearing creditor’ should be compensated 
by ‘the fraudulent debtor’, or otherwise it would induce creditors to instantly resort to a legal 
action without giving their opponents a chance to settle the issue.53 But Judge Leach was not 
persuaded. He argued that the interest on the unliquidated damages should not be allowed, 
because  
if such a usage had prevailed, it is the duty of this court as the court of ultimate Appeal 
from India, to reform that usage and to declare that without the special authority of the 
Legislature in this country such a usage if it had prevailed would have been illegal.54 
This self-proclaimed role as the reformer of Indian legal practice led the Privy Council to 
reject the Manockjee’s argument. Leach was not an enthusiastic reformer in Britain,55 but 
his defence of British legal practice resulted in the reform of Indian practice. As historian 
Ravinder Kumar argues, a conservative in Britain could be a reformer in India.56 In this 
sense, he shared the Court of Directors’ anxiety over West’s judgement, which involved ‘a 
doctrine of such dangerous tendency and so subversive of all the means of check and 
controul established by the constitution’.57 As a result of the judgement, compensation for 
Manockjee was reduced from Rs 5,27,000 to Rs 1,48,000. Manockjee petitioned that the 
next governor, John Malcolm, reverse the Privy Council’s decision, as it was ‘given either in 
total ignorance or direct disregard of the established usage and practice’. However, the 
government did not listen and decided that he should refund the money to the government in 
18 years with annual payments of Rs 25,000.58 
Despite the failure of realising its claim, the case of Cursetjee Manockjee was important 
as an initial attempt of Bombay merchants’ resorting to the King’s Court to challenge the 
government. It heightened the government’s anxiety about the King’s Court’s interference, 
especially because they feared that their conduct in wartime would be shackled by the 
ignorant civil authority’s inspection. On a deeper level, this different recognition of the 
military constitution indicated that the King’s Court and the government had different views 
on British sovereignty in India. West thought that the governments in different presidencies 
constituted a unitary polity which had sovereignty all over India. Furthermore, the 
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government of India was identical to the government of England. The territorial sovereignty 
of the British had already been established in his view. Within that territory, the sovereign 
justice of the King’s Court should be available for all of the King’s subjects. On the other 
hand, the government’s understanding of the British constitution in India was pluralist. The 
Bombay government was distinguished from the governments of Bengal and Madras. This 
assumption of plurality was related to the officials’ view of Indian politics. It was based on 
the idea that the British government was still essentially a regional power among other 
Indian chiefs. Their supremacy was still more nominal than real. Justice should be arranged 
in accordance with the reality, where different chiefs shared sovereignty with the 
government.59 This contrast of civil and military visions of Indian politics was more 
noticeably disputed in the next case between another Bombay merchant and the government. 
Refuting the Government’s Military Ideology: 
The Case of Amerchund Bedreechund 
The other notable case in which a Bombay merchant/banker sued the EIC and its higher 
officials was the case of Amerchund Bedreechund v. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Henry 
Dundas Robertson and the East India Company. The process was similar to the Manockjee 
case: the native merchant petitioned the government to realise his demand; the government 
rejected it; the merchant resorted to the King’s Court; the King’s Court decided in favour of 
the merchant; the government appealed the Privy Council; the Privy Council reversed the 
decision of the King’s Court. The King’s Court’s interference in the military affairs was also 
the main issue of dispute. The contrasting visions of Indian society became the focus of 
debate in the court room, and the government’s military conception of society was 
challenged by the King’s Court’s civilian perspective. 
The case originated in the capture of a Peshwa’s treasurer during the Third Maratha War. 
In 1817, Narroba Outia, the treasurer, was in charge of the fort at Rhygur when it was 
besieged by British troops. Narroba agreed to the terms of capitulation and surrendered the 
fort; the treasure was captured by the British army. However, Captain Robertson, the 
collector, judge and magistrate of Poona, suspected that Narroba hid some of the treasure in 
his house at Poona. Robertson searched Narroba’s house and found a large sum of gold. 
Robertson seized it as booty of war. Narroba claimed it was his private property, demanded 
compensation and started to complain about the harsh treatment he received from Robertson. 
Narroba sent petitions to the Deccan Commissioner, William Chaplin, who made an inquiry 
in November 1819 and rejected Narroba’s claim. Narroba filed a suit in the Recorder’s Court 
in 1822 but died soon afterward and the case was not heard. His trustee, Ameerchund 
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Bedreechund, a Hindu banker and merchant,60 sued the EIC in the Supreme Court in 1826.61 
The trial of Amerchund Bedreechund v. Elphinstone, Robertson and EIC decided in 
favour of the plaintiff. Bedreechund employed James Morley, notorious for his 
anti-government attitude, and another barrister as his counsel. The Company was defended 
by George Norton, Advocate General, and two other barristers. This meant that five out of 
the seven barristers in Bombay were involved in the case. The trial was held between the 
25th of September and the 14th of November 1826, and the judgement was given on the 
28th of November 1826. Morley harangued that the defendants were guilty of exercising 
illegal authority; Robertson’s atrocity was only comparable to the deputies of the French 
Revolution. He continued that this trial would prove that the Supreme Court had the 
authority to redress their injustice; hundreds of similar cases were to be applied and 
thousands of people would come to complain their torts against the Company.62 Edward 
West, the chief justice, and Charles Chambers, the puisne judge, endorsed this view and gave 
a judgement in favour of Bedreechund. The court ordered the defendants to pay Rs 
17,50,000, with costs of Rs 16,000.63 
The judgement was based on three points which highlight the difference between the 
judges and the government over the law and governance in the newly conquered territories. 
Firstly, West strongly criticised the Company’s oppressive treatment of Naroba, which was, 
according to him, ‘the most important feature of the case’. He detailed Robertson’s 
oppressions and criticised the Deccan Commissioner’s examination for also being 
unreasonably harsh. He concluded that, as the confession of Naroba was obtained ‘by means 
the most illegal and oppressive’, it was not proven that the money was the Peshwa’s.64 
Secondly, West argued that the government’s seizure of Narroba and his property 
occurred after the end of the war. Citing Lord Mansfield, West argued that Poona was 
already in a state of peace because: (1) a proclamation had been issued by Governor 
Elphinstone, which promised that ‘all property, real or personal, will be secure’, and (2) the 
courts of justice had been introduced. Therefore, Narroba had ceased to be an alien enemy 
when he was captured, and thus he should have been under the protection of the government 
as a King’s subject. West added that the seizure was not based on jure belli, since Naroba 
was under the protection of the conqueror, and rejected the government’s claim that the 
seizure was done bona fide as booty.65 
The judges’ third and most important argument was that the King’s Court had 
jurisdiction over the government’s military operation. West articulated that the acts of a 
                                                        
60 He dealt with piece goods, joys, jewels and precious stones both in Bombay and Poona. Maharashtra State Archives, 
High Court Record, Supreme Court equity bundle, 1829, no. 97/82–86. 
61 There was another related case in the King’s Court, King v. Bedreechund, which I do not discuss in this article because 
the major points of controversy were the same. 
62 George Norton, Advocate General, to Gov, 30 Nov. 1826, Bombay Political Consultations [BPC], 6 Dec. 1826, v57. 
63 The judgement is printed in the Oriental Herald, 14, 1827, 1–40; 2 State Trials, 370–458. Citations below are from the 
former. 
64 Oriental Herald, 14, 1827, 12–18. 
65 Ibid., 19–21. 
Law, Agency and Emergency in British Imperial Politics│ 
 
219 
government were subject to the jurisdiction of municipal courts. In order to emphasise the 
tyrannical nature of the claim of the government, he quoted Mansfield’s judgement in 
Fabrigas v. Mostyn, which stated that ‘to maintain here that every governor, in every place, 
can act absolutely; that he may spoil, plunder, affect their bodies and their liberty, and is 
accountable to nobody, is a doctrine not to be maintained’.66 
Judge Chambers went further to insist that it was not the government but the King’s 
Court that had the power to decide on the state of exception. He admitted that the officers 
should be allowed latitude of conduct in times of war, but this should not be applied in every 
case: ‘such exceptions, however, when they occur, must be shown to rest upon their proper 
and distinct grounds, and cannot be presumed to be right unless the particular expediency or 
necessity is pointed out’.67 In other words, if the King’s Court declared so, any acts of the 
government in times of war could be amenable to its jurisdiction. These arguments by West 
and Chambers were important, as they would enable the King’s Court to check the 
government’s wartime activities. This assertion of military jurisdiction generated a strong 
sense of danger among the government officials. 
The problem was that, as in the case of Manockjee, the government could not prove the 
state of war because of the court’s rulings of evidence and therefore could not protect their 
officers from the suit in the King’s Court. Advocate General Norton reported that much of the 
defendant’s evidence was unfairly rejected by the court. For example, the correspondence of 
the government officials and even the government’s proclamation in the Deccan were rejected 
because the originals were not produced. He explained that since it was almost impossible to 
prove the very existence of war, and thus the rights of war and conquest, all future proceedings 
of the EIC servants in these emergencies were to be judged by the mere municipal law, rather 
than as acts of state in bona fide execution of the rights of war.68 
Furthermore, Elphinstone had to worry about a more direct surveillance of the military 
operation, as Bedreechund demanded the government to produce its confidential papers 
relating to the war as evidence. Elphinstone cautioned that ‘if the records of every 
department are once placed at the mercy of every attorney who makes an application to the 
Supreme Court, there can be no secrecy in any affair, foreign and domestic, and no 
confidence in our own deliberations, or in the persons with whom we have to communicate 
in any transaction’.69 
Elphinstone’s anxiety was based on his understanding that the Deccan was still in a state 
of war. He pointed out that the judges had a false view of the state of Poona. It was ‘the 
turbulent capital of a country of which the conquest was still in progress’.70 Indeed, the 
Deccan in the 1820s was still in a state of crisis. Highway robberies by the ‘hill tribes’, such 
as the Bhils and the Ramusis, were prevalent, and in 1824, as a development of the Burma 
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War, there was a rumour that a brother of the Peshwa would ally with the Pindari (another 
major hill caste) and rise against the British.71 In the same year, the British Political Agent 
was killed in a large scale rebellion in Kittur in the Deccan.72 In such a situation, the priority 
of the government in the area was to maintain its tranquillity, and thus the government’s 
military operation should be free from the vigilant eyes of the King’s Court. 
Elphinstone anticipated a difficult situation in which the government officials would be 
involved in the future. He vindicated Roberson’s conduct in the ‘arduous situation at a 
season between war and peace when he was neither safe from the plots of the enemy nor 
from the scrutiny of a municipal court—he had not regulations to direct him and is attacked 
for following the practice of the Marrattas by which alone he could be guided’.73 In other 
words, if they could not sufficiently enforce their military control, they would be preyed on 
by their enemies; but if they were too vigilant and too strict in following the military 
(Maratha) way of rule, they could be prosecuted in the King’s Court. Elphinstone feared this 
legal anomaly in which the government officials would be left with little scope to achieve the 
just balance of their military manoeuvre.74 
The case of Amerchund Bedreechund raised another important concern among the 
government officials which was not observed in the case of Cursetjee Manockjee: the 
summons of the sardars (Indian aristocrats). Towards these ‘real rulers in the country’,75 the 
government took a general policy of conciliation, as their cooperation was essential for 
maintaining the order and tranquillity in the localities. The government secured their 
privileges and exempted them from the EIC’s judicial process as in the same way as under 
the Maratha polity.76 
In the case of Bedreechund, however, the King’s Court summoned the sardars and their 
subordinates to Bombay, including the most powerful of them, Chintaman Rao 
Patwardhan.77 If they refused to attend, they might be prosecuted for contempt of court. The 
government was particularly concerned about the complaints made by the rajas of Satara and 
Vinchorekur. When the servants of the raja of Satara were summoned, the raja expressed his 
surprise that it was issued without any previous intimation. The government stated that it 
would prevent its recurrence and solicited him to send the witnesses to Bombay. The raja did 
so, but further complained that the judicial business in his court was delayed by it.78 The raja 
of Vinchorekur was also told by the agent of Bedreechund that he himself would be 
summoned. He complained to the government that ‘this was a great innovation, and that the 
chief’s dignity would be entirely ruined in the world should he be obliged to appear at the 
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bar of the court at Bombay’.79 
Receiving these reports, Elphinstone expressed his grave sense of danger. He said these 
proceedings would certainly convince the sardars that the Supreme Court could threaten 
them and the government had no power to prevent it. In consequence, he continued, chiefs 
would feel considerable uneasiness at the Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of sovereignty’ within 
their territories and think that the King’s Court was equal to the government. He concluded 
that ‘a good deal of the ferment in the Deckan was produced by the general circulation of 
these summonses’.80 
Indeed, Elphinstone anticipated that the King’s Court’s interference would provoke a 
collapse of the EIC’s rule in the mofussil. He drafted a despatch to the Court of Directors to 
obtain an immediate redress.81 He warned that a false impression was spread in the Deccan 
that all who were opposed to the government would be supported by the Supreme Court. He 
predicted that ‘great confusion will be produced … [and] it will be necessary for us to keep 
up a more vigilant control over the Chiefs and to alter our plan of government to one of great 
strictness in all respects’. Elphinstone referred to an example of the raja of Kolhapur, who 
was reported to apply to the Supreme Court to set aside his peace treaty with the 
government.82 Elphinstone further cautioned that the Indians even believed the alteration of 
the government from the EIC to the Supreme Court at the expiration of the charter in 1834.83 
These comments illustrate the location of the sense of crisis caused by the King’s Court in 
the mofussil: it would unleash the disloyal rallying of the independent chiefs and sardars 
around the King’s Court to challenge the government. 
So the government appealed to the Privy Council.84 Bedreechund had died soon after the 
judgement of the Supreme Court, and now his cause was succeeded by his trustees, 
Heerachund Bedreechund and Jetmul Anoopchund. They employed reformist lawyers in 
Britain in the same way as Cursetjee Manockjee did. Their agent in London was John 
Hopton Forbes, solicitor and a relation of radical MP Charles Forbes. John Williams, KC, a 
staunch whig who was elected as an MP several times, and Thomas Denman, the counsel for 
Cursetjee Manockjee, spoke for Bedreechund and Anoopchund in the court.85 The judge 
was Lord Tenderden, high tory Lord Chief Justice. The government asserted that the King’s 
Court, as the municipal court, did not have jurisdiction over the military conduct of the 
government and that their evidence was unfairly rejected. The Bedreechund side reiterated 
that the property was Narroba’s and that the seizure was civilly illegal as it was done in 
peacetime, not war.86 The trial was held on the 3rd and the 19th of June, and the judgement 
                                                        
79 Eventually the raja was not summoned. W. H. Wathen, Persian Secretary, to Gov, 24 Aug. and 1 Sep. 1826, BPC 21 
Feb 1827, v77. 
80 Elphinstone, minute, 23 Jan. 1827, BPC 21 Feb. 1827, v77. 
81 Elphinstone, minute, 30 Nov. 1826, BPC 6 Dec. 1826, v58. 
82 Kolhapur was an independent chief in the Deccan. The raja repeatedly exhibited his territorial ambition towards the 
neighbouring state of Satara, which eventually induced the military intervention of the British. 
83 Elphinstone, minute, 1 Dec. 1826, BPC 6 Dec. 1826, v60. 
84 2 State Trial, 410–450; 1 Knapp, 316–61. 
85 IORL/L/Box 54 (386). 
86 The National Archives [TNA], TS 11/123; 2 State Trial, 409–10 
│East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 5 (2016) 
 
222 
was given on the 14th of July 1830. The Privy Council overturned the decision in Bombay. 
It seems that party politics influenced the decision of the case. The course of debate was 
determined by the intervention of Attorney General James Scarlett, newly converted tory 
lawyer/politician and protégé of Wellington, whose influence over Tenterden was 
notorious.87 He made a long speech in favour of the EIC.88 Accordingly, Lord Tenterden 
judged in favour of the Bombay government, saying that the seizure was a hostile seizure 
and that a municipal court had no jurisdiction on the subject. 89  Bedreechund and 
Anoopchund did not abandon their cause there. They connected the Bedreechund case with a 
larger political controversy over the distribution of the Deccan Prize Money.90 A month 
after the judgement, they petitioned the trustees of the Deccan booty, the Duke of Wellington 
and Charles Arbuthnot, which eventually led to another meeting at the Privy Council.91 
However, Tenterden again rejected their argument.92 Wellington’s influence was not small. 
He demanded the full attendance of the councillors at the meeting,93 and this time his 
protégé Scarlett was the counsel for the Bombay government. 
In their campaign in London, the Indian merchants collaborated with the radicals. The 
case was reported in the Oriental Herald with comments by Buckingham. He argued that it 
exemplified the deficiency and corruption of the Company’s judicial system in the mofussil 
run under ‘despotic violence’.94 The radicals also used the case to criticise the corruption of 
the Privy Council itself.95 It was also alleged that Joseph Hume ordered Bedreechund and 
Anoopchund to write a petition in order to use it in the Commons debate.96 The radicals 
emphasised Narroba’s personal calamities and deprivation of his private property and, by 
doing so, pointed out the need for reform of the Privy Council.97 The linkage strategy with 
the Deccan Prize Money case might be proposed by the radicals, who had used it to criticise 
the government before.98 In this way, the Bedreechund case was used to vindicate judicial 
reforms both at home and in the colony. This did not necessarily mean that the Bombay 
merchants identified themselves with the causes of radicals, but it certainly meant that the 
Bombay merchants had a specific interest in radicalism in Britain, as it could increase their 
means to challenge the government. Nonetheless, the fact remained that, in India, the 
government could seize private property without compensation in cases of emergency, 
unrestrained by the judiciary. 
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Conclusion 
This article has pointed out that the Indian merchants’ demand for compensation for 
damages incurred in times of war resulted in the general debate on the character of British 
governance in India. The problem was that, in the midst of 1820s crisis, the government’s 
militarist logic of emergency was denied by the judges’ civilian claim of the rule of law. The 
officials feared that the King’s Court’s rulings would hinder its conduct of war in the future 
and disturb the tranquillity of the newly conquered territories. In the end, the government’s 
insistence of state necessity was sanctioned in the appeal cases, and the judges’ alternative 
vision of colonial governance was rejected. 
These cases illustrate some features of the networks and power involved in imperial 
judicial politics. The Bombay merchants actively relied on the imperial network of lawyers 
and radicals. In Bombay, those lawyers who had an anti-establishment inclination such as 
Attorney Ayrton or Barrister Morley were essential for their challenge to the government. 
They were the source of legal knowledge and techniques and acted as agents inside and 
outside the court. In London, radical MPs such as Hume, Buckingham and Forbes and 
reformist lawyers such as Denman enabled them to access metropolitan journalists, lawyers 
and politicians. The network also determined discourse. Especially when the stage was 
moved to Britain after the government’s appeal, the contest was put in the metropolitan 
ideological and discursive constellation which was distinct from India. It enabled the Indian 
merchants to gain support from the radicals, but they were, in the end, defeated by the 
conquest ideology of the tories embodied in the solid institutional structure of appeal in the 
empire.99 
In conclusion, I suggest that the Indian agency which generated the government’s sense 
of crisis was the driving force of the transformation of political structure in the long run. 
These cases of Bombay merchants were part of a larger story of conflict between the 
government and the King’s Court in Bombay in the 1820s. First, the King’s Court criticised 
the government’s encroachment of the autonomy of Bombay city, which was governed by 
powerful British merchants.100 Second, the collection of revenue in the mofussil was 
hindered by the revenue defaulters’ use of the King’s Court to overturn the decree of the 
Company’s Court. Third, the King’s Court’s summonses were repeatedly issued to the 
sardars, and, to make matters worse, the sardars and independent princes themselves started 
to resort to the authority of the King’s Court to challenge the government. The sense of crisis 
culminated in the two cases of habeas corpus in 1828, in which the government directly 
interfered in the process of the King’s Court. As a result of these conflicts, the government 
officials both in India and in Britain realised the need to make a unitary and hierarchical 
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structure of administration. The charter renewal in 1834 embodied this aspiration, which 
subordinated the King’s Court to the governor-general’s legislative council.101 In other 
words, the indigenous practices within eighteenth-century legal pluralism generated a new, 
sovereign legal system in India in the nineteenth century. A global transition from hybrid to 
sovereign legal regimes needs further comparative studies.102  Britain should also be 
included in such comparisons because, as Julian Hoppit’s recent argument on the 
vulnerability of property suggests, it also shared many ‘colonial’ elements of politics.103 
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